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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) reported that over 90% of in-road accidents in 2015
occurred purely because of drivers’ errors and misjudgements,
with factors such as fatigue and other sorts of distractions
being the main cause of these accidents [1]. One promising
solution for reducing (or even resolving) such human errors
is via autonomous or computer-assisted driving systems. As
such, autonomous vehicles (AVs) are currently being designed
with the aim of reducing fatalities in accidents by being
insusceptible to typical driver errors. Moreover, in addition
to improved safety, autonomous systems offer many other
potential benefits to society: i) improved fuel efficiency beyond
that of human driving, making driving more cost-beneficial
and environmentally friendly, ii) reducing commute times due
to improved driving behaviours and coordination amongst
autonomous vehicles, and iii) better driving experience for
individuals with disabilities, to name a few.
Given the extensive global interest towards the deployment
of AV technologies, recent studies have introduced new guide-
lines and regulations for speeding up AV development and
pushing AVs into the market in a more effective manner. At
the same time, there have been significant efforts to inform
the public on the capabilities and limitations of AV systems.
The most widely used approach to categorize AV systems
is to classify them based on their level of automation, as
standardized by Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) [2],
ranging from level zero (no automation) to level five (com-
pletely autonomous). Although a level five AV is the ideal,
the majority of current AV systems are at levels one and
two. The limited autonomous driving capabilities of current
AV systems are due to a range of challenges such as the
high cost of sensors, a lack of acceptance by the public,
a lack of appropriate safety evaluations, and the high error
rates of existing technologies. In this study, we focus on those
challenges associated with level three or higher [2].
Although different levels of automation can lead to some
variations in the developed systems; the general architecture
of an autonomous driving system consists of five main compo-
nents, as shown in Figure 1, grouped into two main areas of I)
perception and II) decision/control. Perception includes all of
the hardware and software attempting to find the current state
of the AV system with respect to its surrounding environment,
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such that this information can be used as the input to decision
and control. Sensors, algorithms to process the sensed data,
environmental mapping, and localizing the AV with respect to
the generated map are all components within perception.
Sensor devices which are typically used in AV perception in-
clude LiDAR, various types of visual cameras, GPS, RADAR,
as well as Internet of Vehicles (IoV) devices.
Raw sensory data are processed by a variety of algorithms to
generate useful information regarding the environment around
the AV, of which three examples include
1) Object detection, responsible for taking sensor data and
detecting important objects of interest such as traffic
lights, traffic signs, road, lanes, pedestrians, and other
vehicles;
2) Semantic segmentation, responsible for segmenting the
road and its participants from sidewalk and objects that
are not within the road;
3) Scene reconstruction, responsible for generating 3D
scenes based on 2D images and/or LiDAR devices.
The perception algorithms employed are clearly a function
of the automated driving level [2], for example while cruise
control (based on LiDAR or Radar sensors) is a functionality
in level 1, lane-centering (visible images and a segmentation
model) is one of the main tasks in level 2. Level 3 driving
systems are ones that can truly be considered autonomous, a
level of autonomy which can allow drivers to sit back and
relax. As such, several models are being used to perform
the automated driving. Traffic signs and traffic lights are
detected by object detection models, typically based on visible
camera images; other cars driving in the road can be detected
using object detection models by fusing sensory data from
different sources; and the valid area in which the car can
drive is identified by segmentation models. While drivers can
be “hands-off” in level 3 vehicles, they need to be ready to
engage and take control at any time. In contrast, drivers can be
“mind-off” in level 4 vehicles, but only in certain, geofenced
traffic areas, or in Level 5 vehicles in any situation.
Different perception models1 may be used independently for
different tasks such as lane segmentation, traffic sign identi-
fication, and traffic light detection; however, this information
should be fused for path planning and decision-making, for
example to be able to associate different signs and lights to
a particular lane in the road. Nonetheless, such fusion is still
a challenging task, and as such using predefined maps can
1Some state-of-the-art comparison results on two different computer vision
applications can be found in the supplementary material.
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Fig. 1. The general architecture of an autonomous driving system, which is comprised of two main components of Perception and Decision-making. The
perception system typically consists of a set of machine learning algorithms, and provides a semantic understanding of the world around the vehicle. The
perception system can be negatively affected by different types of intrusion algorithms, commonly referred to as adversarial attacks. The perception system
(and especially the ‘Sensing the World’ module) are the first step between the outside world and the autonomous driving system; therefore, any incorrect
conclusions from the perception system, due to adversarial attacks, will propagate to later components, leading to potentially fatal decisions being made. The
Decision-Making component of an AVs is comprised of Motion Planning, Decision Making and Control. These modules are responsible to identify the best
path for the vehicle and to actuate the car towards that.
mitigate this problem to some extent in a practical scenario
and increases association accuracy.
Localization and mapping systems provide a map of the en-
vironment surrounding the autonomous vehicle and determine
the current state (i.e., position and orientation) of the AV with
respect to this detailed map.
Given the mapping of the environment and the AV’s current
state, the decision system makes decisions on what actions to
be taken in order to optimally reach a goal; that is, responsible
for generating route proposals, motion planning for each of
those routes, evaluating compliance with passenger prefer-
ences and the law [48], calculating safety probabilities of each
proposed trajectory, and making decisions on which trajectory
to select. The control system acts upon these decisions and
controls the vehicle, generating appropriate commands and
ensuring that the proposed trajectory is followed. There remain
several challenges regarding the interaction of these two parts.
In particular, the decision-control system should reevaluate
the possible risks in different situations constantly and predict
the intentions of human drivers around the vehicle. As such,
effectively estimating uncertainty is very important, however
understanding human driver intention is still not a common
practice in the field, and is usually relaxed in the problem
formulation.
A more granular description of the five components of an
autonomous driving system is as follows:
1) Sensing the world consists of various sensors and
algorithms processing the available data and provides
a semantic scene understanding [3].
2) Localization and mapping computes the AV pose
(location and orientation) with respect to the surrounding
environment, which is frequently addressed via simulta-
neous localization and mapping (SLAM) techniques [5],
well-known in robotics and off-line pre-mapping.
3) Motion planning provides different trajectories as se-
quences of states, given the environment information,
initial states, and the final goal [9].
4) Decision-making selects the optimal trajectory, while
considering other factors like safety, compliance,
etc. [1].
5) Control actuates components and ensures that the AV
follows the selected path [1].
The preceding modular structure requires harmonizing all
components together, training all components together, and
reducing the propagation of erroneous decision-making from
level to level. As a result of these limitations, end-to-end
autonomous driving systems have been proposed, in which
the components are learned as a single system. For example,
Bojarski et al. [8] proposed PilotNet, a deep CNN based
framework that takes visual data from cameras as sensory input
and delivers a simple autonomous system for lane following
by outputting steering angles based on a fully end-to-end
approach. Caltagirone et al. [9] utilized a fully convolutional
network to generate path proposals from LiDAR sensory data,
a partial end-to-end paradigm.
Whether fully end-to-end, partial, or broken into classical
components, deep learning methods are now at the heart of
essentially all AV technologies. Although deep neural network
models provide the state-of-the-art performance in most scene
understanding algorithmic tasks, the robustness of neural net-
work models has become a major concern in the research
community. In the context of AV systems, extreme weather
conditions and possible intrusion attacks by adversaries are
two key situations where these models may be particularly
vulnerable.
As seen in Figure 1, incorrect scene understanding by the
‘Sensing the world’ module, the first module in the sequence,
can propagate wrong information through the pipeline of
consecutive modules and end up with an incorrect decision,
possibly a fatal outcome. False information may be generated
for a variety of reasons, such as severe weather conditions,
complicated urban scenarios, and intrusion by adversaries,
raising major concerns on the safety and security of DNN
models.
3In this paper, we study how adversarial attacks can upend
the claimed or assessed robustness of deep neural networks,
specifically in the application to autonomous vehicles. We
mainly discuss how these attacks can impose danger to AV
perception, and how these threats can propagate through the
entire pipeline. We will analyze the existing mechanisms to
address these issues, and will describe the best practices to
improve AV systems.
II. ROBUSTNESS CHALLENGES IN AUTONOMOUS DRIVING
SYSTEMS
In this section, we describe two main factors which can in-
fluence the robustness of machine learning models specifically
for autonomous driving applications. While several different
criteria can affect the robustness of a machine learning model,
here we focus on adverse conditions and adversarial attacks
as prominent factors. Autonomous navigation requires an
understanding of the environment around the car, and machine
learning models play an important role in fulfilling this task. In
particular, these models need to perform perfectly in different
environments and scenarios, a degree of generalization which
will be an important factor in reliable autonomous systems.
A. Wide Variations and Adverse Conditions
Generalization can be defined as the ability of a trained
model to deal with samples which were not seen during
training. In contrast to generalization, models can also be
subject to overfitting, whereby a model essentially memorizes
the training samples, and indeed performs with high accuracy
on that training data, but providing poor performance on
unseen testing data. To measure the generalization of a model,
the generalization error is defined as the difference between the
expected and empirical errors. The empirical error is defined
as the model error on the available sample data, whereas
the expected error measures how the model can perform
over variation of the data based on their true (but normally
unknown) underlying distribution. The available test set should
be large enough to be able to calculate a reliable empirical
error in order to quantify model generalization.
Understanding generalization is key in autonomous driving
systems because of the safety-critical aspects of these systems.
A generalized autonomous system should perform reliably in a
wide variety of different conditions and variations, particularly
challenging in autonomous driving applications due to the
extremely stochastic environments around the vehicle, which
can cause a distribution drift. For example, an autonomous
vehicle trained in one country and tested in another one will
face inputs that did not exist in training.
Generalization and robustness issues have certainly been
studied for different applications. Visual domain adaptation
and Generative adversarial networks (GAN) are two differ-
ent techniques proposed to improve model generalization.
Tzeng et al. [10] took advantage of GAN methods to generate
new samples and they used discriminative modelling and
weight sharing to improve the domain adaptation on different
classification tasks. Yang et al. [11] proposed a method to keep
the generalization ability of an autonomous driving system by
mapping real data into a unified domain and to make decisions
on the virtual data.
Any autonomous driving system needs to be functional
in real-world contexts and outdoor environments, performing
reliably in different weather conditions or different lighting
situations.
A first simple but important situation is the system perfor-
mance at nighttime, particularly the functionality of vision-
based models. Taking advantage of Lidar or far-infrared (FIR)
sensors and data fusion is one approach, however there is a
body of research [12] on directly improving the robustness of
vision-based models in dark environments.
Dai and Van Gool [12] proposed a new adaptation mecha-
nism to address the semantic segmentation problem at night-
time. They utilized twilight images as an intermediate step to
adapt the models to darker environments before fine-tuning
the model for nighttime scenes, a so-called Gradual Model
Adaptation process.
The main issue in generalizing models to adverse conditions
is the availability of training data to use in model learning. For
example, thick fog is observable only during 0.01% of typical
driving in North America; therefore, having enough samples
for annotation and preparing training data is very challenging.
As a result, generating synthetic data may be highly desirable.
Sakaridis et al. [13] introduced a new approach to synthesize
foggy driving scene data from clear-weather outdoor scenes;
their results showed that utilizing synthetic data helps the
model to generalize better on foggy scenarios and leads to
more robust predictions.
While providing enough data with sufficiently var-
ied/adverse conditions is necessary, devising proper frame-
works and method to handle these conditions are crucial
as well. Utilizing LiDAR or FIR data might resolve night-
time scenarios, however acquiring reliable LiDAR information
might be challenging in severe conditions such as rain, snow or
foggy situations. As a result, fusing information from different
sources and sensors is a common approach. Several methods
have focused on when and in which step such fusion should
be performed. Methods can be divided into two main streams
of early-fusion [14], where the features extracted from each
sensor are intertwined and knowledge fusion is performed in
an early stage of the network, versus late-fusion [26], where
each sensor datum is processed independently and the results
are combined at the end.
B. Intruding Autonomous Driving Systems
Besides the natural challenges just discussed, unnatural
factors may challenge autonomous driving systems as well.
Essentially every software system is prone to some sort of in-
trusion, whether via physical access to the system or intrusions
without any explicit interaction between intruder and physical
system. For autonomous vehicle systems, it is the machine
learning models which are our main concern in this paper;
since learned models understand the world based on sensory
data, it is possible to intrude the system by providing deceiving
sensory input which fools the machine learning models.
41) Adversarial Attacks: Generally, attacks can be applied
on any part of an intelligent system, such as on the training
data (training set poisoning), model output (model theft),
and manipulated inputs (adversarial examples). Since careful
model learning should avoid or limit the first two effects, it is
the most likely attack, that of manipulating sensor inputs as
adversarial attacks, which will be our focus.
Adversarial examples are those input samples that can fool a
trained model with a high confidence. In particular, those input
samples which reliably fool the trained model, at the same time
only barely (or not at all) perceptible to the human eye. In an
adversarial attack, the main goal is to find an input sample
x′ close to the true sample x which changes the prediction
from conclusion y = f(x) to conclusion y′ = f(x′), such
that y 6= y′. ideally the difference between x and x′, the
perturbation size, is very small, making the input perturbation
close to imperceptible. Typically the perturbation is measured
using an lp norm:
η = ‖x′ − x‖p. (1)
There are two types of adversarial attacks, white-box attacks
and black-box attacks [16]. In a white-box attack, the adversary
has a full access to the trained model, and knowledge regarding
the model structure and parameters to allow for a fairly
informed attack. In a black-box attack the adversarial method
does not have access to the model, so the adversary has to
query the target model in order to estimate those needed
aspects of the model’s interior structure.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [40] and DeepFool [18]
are two simple, but well-known, examples of white-box at-
tacks. These two attacks fall into the class of first-order
adversaries, which use the gradients of the network loss
function with respect to the input data to perturb input samples
into adversarial examples.
However black-box attacks are more applicable in real
world scenarios, and certainly more applicable in autonomous
driving systems, as these systems are not accessible, in gen-
eral, to outsiders. Black-box attacks may be undertaken by
ensemble-based approaches, which use multiple trained mod-
els and generate common adversarial examples, which are then
validated on the target model. In other words, ensemble-based
attacks generate adversarial samples using a white-box attack,
which are then utilized to attack the target model in black
box form, what is known as a transferable attack. A second
black-box approach is that of Zeroth-Order Optimization [37],
which tries to estimate the gradient and Hessian of the network
function using the inputs and outputs of the model.
Another perspective is to divide adversarial methods into
targeted and non-targeted attacks. A targeted approach tries
to change the input in a way to have the model predicts
a particular specified (targeted) class label. For example,
inducing the network to recognize a stop sign as a speed limit
sign could be the outcome of this method. A non-targeted
method manipulates a trained model to misclassify the input
data without constraining the objective toward any specific
class label.
Furthermore, for applications like object detection there
are positive and negative classes, and adversarial samples are
generated to either fool the model to not to detect the object,
or to classify the object to a wrong class label. For example,
a vision based autonomous driving system may mis-classify
a tree as a traffic sign (false positive) or may not classify a
traffic sign at all (false negative). Table VI summarizes the
most well-known adversarial attack algorithms.
2) Defence Mechanisms: In addition to the development of
algorithms to challenge/attack deep neural network models,
a variety of defence mechanisms have been proposed, to
improve network robustness or mitigate the issue of facing
adversarial perturbations.
Model robustness against adversarial attacks can be ad-
dressed during training [40], most simply by augmenting the
training set with adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. [40]
regularized the training of a deep neural network model by an
adversarial objective function based on the fast gradient sign
method:
Jˆ(θ, x, y) = (2)
α · J(θ, x, y) + (1− α) · J(θ, x+  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)))
where J(·) is the training objective function. Given the uni-
versal approximator theorem2, they argued that if adversarial
examples are encoded in the training process, the model should
learn those examples and become more robust in dealing with
those (and hopefully other) examples. That is, the model is
continually supplied with adversarial examples, such that they
essentially resist the current version of the model, applied in
an iterative process to make the model progressively more
robust. While this technique does improve the robustness of
deep neural networks, it has been shown by Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [18] that there is still an effective and yet a universal
adversarial example to fool even such adversarially trained
networks; nevertheless this approach is still the most common
in increasing deep neural network robustness.
The robustness of deep neural network models can also be
improved by simply performing a pre-processing step on the
input data. The adversarial attacks are usually generated as
an additive perturbation, almost noise [40], on the input data.
As such, the attack can be defended by heuristically removing
input noise, using any number of signal processing techniques,
such as a moving average operator, or taking advantage of
compression methods [41] to remove high-frequency values.
Motivated by these ideas, Xie et al. [39] illustrated that
random resizing or random padding of input images reduces
the effectiveness of adversarial attacks. At the same time it
is worth noting that these changes to the input data may also
reduce the accuracy of the model.
Goldblum et al. [44] proposed a new distillation-based
approach, which incorporates robust training of a student
network. The proposed method follows a similar technique
as adversarial training, but in the context of distillation, where
a “student” network is sought to mimic the teacher’s outputs
within an -ball of training samples.
It is also possible to take advantage of post-processing
techniques to improve the network robustness. Utilizing an
2Universal approximator theorem: A neural network with at least one
hidden layer can represent any function to an arbitrary degree of accuracy,
assuming the hidden layer to have enough units.
5TABLE I
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMON ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS. ATTACKS ARE CHARACTERIZED BASED ON WHETHER THEY ARE WHITE-BOX OR
BLACK-BOX (I.E., HAVING ACCESSING TO MODEL DETAILS OR NOT), THE NUMBER OF NETWORK QUERIES TO BE ABLE TO GENERATE THE PERTURBED
INPUT (ATTACK FREQUENCY), AND HOW THEY MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF PERTURBATION ADDED TO THE INPUT DATA. THESE CHARACTERISTICS ARE
DESCRIBED BASED ON THE MOST COMMON APPROACHES WHICH THESE METHODS ARE USED, HOWEVER IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THESE METHODS
TO CHANGE THE CHARACTERISTICS AS WELL. MORE DETAILS AND THE REFERENCES TO THESE METHODS CAN BE FOUND IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY
MATERIAL [].
Method White-Box/Black-Box Targeted/Non-Targeted Attack Frequency Measurement
FGSM White-Box Non-Targeted One-time element-wise
DeepFool White-Box Non-Targeted Iterative lp
C&W White-Box Targeted Iterative l1, l2, l∞
PGD White-Box Both Iterative l∞
ZOO Black-Box Both Iterative l2
One-Pixel Black-Box Both Iterative l0
ensemble of deep neural networks [45] allows decision-making
to be aggregated across several models, improving robustness
against adversarial attacks. This strategy can be combined with
averaging [24] or noise perturbation [25] to make adversarial
attacks more difficult. Table VII summarizes the main tech-
niques to improve robustness of deep neural networks against
adversarial attacks.
3) Adversarial Attacks for Autonomous Driving Systems:
Autonomous driving systems are among the pioneering fields
in advancing machine learning and deep learning techniques,
and complex deep learning networks are utilized in all phases
from perception to decision-making and control. As a result,
the effect of adversarial attacks has been significantly investi-
gated for autonomous driving applications.
Chen et al. [26] proposed a new approach to fool the
well-known Faster RCNN object detection. They generated
adversarial attacks that trick the model into not detecting stop
signs in a scene. They took advantage of Expectation over
Transformation [27], where a random noise is added in each
iteration of the optimization to infer more robust adversarial
perturbations. Lu et al. [28] proposed an optimization method
searching through different sets of stop sign examples to craft
new stop sign images which are not detectable by Faster
RCNN or YOLO network architectures.
However it has been argued [29] that designing adversarial
perturbation for real systems, in practice, is harder than
those analyzed in the literature and in laboratory environ-
ments. Lu et al. [29] explained that since object detection and
decision-making in autonomous driving cars are performed
based on a sequence of frames, it is far more difficult to fool
a model for all frames, than for one frame.
To be sure, recent algorithms have been proposed to craft
adversarial attack in real environments. Eykholt et al. [30]
introduced robust physical perturbation methods which can
generate perturbations under different physical conditions.
Figure 2 demonstrates an example of this approach, where
a physical perturbation is added to a stop sign, causing
the model to misclassify the stop sign. They took several
conditions into account including environmental constraints,
spatial constraints and physical limits on imperceptibility
while optimizing the perturbation noise. These conditions are
incorporated into the loss function during the optimization
step. It is worth mentioning that these types of changes to
traffic signs are usually considered as ordinary changes which
Fig. 2. An example of a physical perturbation designed to fool a deep neural
network model to misclassify a stop sign. Adding these types of perturbations
may not often draw a human’s attention as they may be assumed to be
regular artifacts on the traffic sign (an example shown in the left image).
The right image demonstrates a physical attack that would cause the model
to misclassify the stop sign. The example is extracted directly from [30].
usually do not bring up any suspicions for human inspectors.
In other words, these types of perturbations might not be
noticeable to human inspection as viable intrusions.
Sitawarin et al. [31] proposed a new algorithm which
modifies logos and advertisements such that the deep learning
model detects them as different traffic signs in a scene.
Figure 3 shows an example of this scenario. The refinement on
the advertisement logo can fool the targeted model to classify
the image as a “Bicycle Crossing” sign.
While most of the research in the literature has focused on
deep neural networks taking RGB images as input, these issues
are not RGB-specific. Recently, Cao et al. [32] analyzed the
vulnerability of LiDAR-based methods in autonomous driving
systems. They proposed an optimization based approach to
generate real-world adversarial objects, evading the LiDAR-
based detection framework, generating 3D objects which can
fool the network and be invisible to detection.
III. BEST PRACTICES TOWARD ROBUST AUTONOMOUS
DRIVING
In the previous section, we discussed the factors and issues
influencing the robustness of an autonomous driving system.
In this section, we will discuss the best practices to achieve
more reliable systems for autonomous driving applications.
6TABLE II
DIFFERENT DEFENSE MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE THE ROBUSTNESS OF DEEP NEURAL NETWORK MODELS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS. THESE
APPROACHES CAN BE PERFORMED IN PRE-PROCESSING, DURING TRAINING, POST-PROCESSING, OR EVEN BY CHANGING THE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE.
Method Procedure Description
Random Resizing/Random Padding [39] Pre-Processing Changing the size of the input imagebefore passing to the network.
Adversarial Training [40] Training Adding targeted perturbed samplesto the training data.
Compression [41] Pre-Processing Compress and decompress the input samplesbefore passing to the network.
Distillation [44] Training/Post-Processing Training a student network giventhe original (teacher) network.
Ensemble [45] Post-Processing Aggregating the decision of several networksto mitigate the effect of adversary.
Noise Perturbation [25] Architectural Change/Training Adding auxiliary noise modules in the networkto neuter the effect of adversarial perturbation.
Fig. 3. Example of the adversarial attack proposed by [31], where logos
and advertisements are modified to cause a wrong interpretation by the deep
neural network model. The left image shows an advertisement logo, and the
right image shows the modified logo designed to cause a perception model to
recognize it as a “bicycle crossing” sign. The example is extracted from [31].
The key part of an autonomous driving system which might
challenge the robustness of the system are machine learning
models working to navigate the car. As a result, these models
should be evaluated thoroughly before any deployment. While
the robustness evaluation of each model individually is a first
step, the robustness of these models must also be evaluated
in a combined, closed-loop framework before deployment, as
evaluated by Tuncali et al. [33]. The proposed framework is a
simulated environment which tries to identify problematic test
scenarios by a falsification method. The proposed simulated
environment is comprised of four different parts: i) perception
system (the machine learning model to be examined), ii)
controller, iii) vehicle and environment, and iv) renderer. The
controller takes the detection information from the machine
learning model and object class information, and then esti-
mates the actual positions of the objects (e.g., pedestrians
or vehicles). The role of vehicle and environment modeling
and the renderer is to generate driving scenarios, improving
testing and making it closer to real-world situations without
deployment.
Generating test cases leveraging real-world changes in driv-
ing conditions like rain, fog, snow and lighting conditions are
important in the evaluation of autonomous driving systems.
Having the capability of generating real-world conditions
would help to identify cases which lead to problematic be-
haviour by the autonomous system. This approach decreases
the need for manual testing of rare-case scenarios to some
extent. To this end, Tian et al. proposed DeepTest [34],
an automated approach to generate samples subject to a
wide variety of environmental conditions, to detect erroneous
behaviors of deep neural networks models. The proposed
framework uses linear and convolutional transformations to
change the brightness, contrast or adding fogginess or rain
into real images. The idea is that autonomous driving systems
should behave similarly for specific scenes with these types
of variations; for example, that the steering angle (determined
by a learned network) should not change significantly for a
given scene, but with different lighting or weather conditions
applied. This testing approach can help to pinpoint corner-
cases of inconsistent system behaviour.
There are several research studies examining the effec-
tiveness of simulated data in improving the accuracy and
robustness of perception models in autonomous driving. Ros
et al. [35] introduced SYNTHIA, a synthetic dataset of urban
scenes to improve the performance of semantic segmentation
models in autonomous applications. Their experimental results
demonstrated that using synthetic data in conjunction with
real-world data can boost the average per-class accuracy. This
improvement is significant in classes having limited dataset
instances, such as pedestrians, cars and cyclists. Furthermore,
it has been stated by different autonomous driving groups,
such as Waymo, that taking advantage of simulated driving
systems improves the accuracy and performance of models in
real-world scenarios and in public roads.
Simulated environments are important in finding corner-
cases effectively, and resolving them by providing better
training data or more effective learning. However, it is also
important to improve the intrinsic robustness of machine
learning algorithms. One of the main issues with deep learning
models is that they are fairly deterministic, and furthermore
a lack of measuring the uncertainty in the decision-making
process, making it easy to estimate and predict a network’s
decision-making and making networks vulnerable to attack.
There have been improvements in deep neural network
models to provide uncertainty while making predictions [49].
Model uncertainty measures a DNN’s confidence associated
with a prediction; for example, an autonomous vehicle DNN
system could be exposed to test data that has a different
distribution from that of the training data (for example trained
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Fig. 4. The effect of Bayesian Deep Learning: Model (a) is an end-to-end DNN model with no uncertainty evaluation, while model (b) is Bayesian Deep
Learning based, calculating and propagating uncertainties. In this example, the BDL-based model [48] makes a better decision at the end and prevents a fatal
accident. The diagram is drawn following the structure introduced in [48].
on urban data and tested in highway environments), and
would ideally be expected to be uncertain in its predictions
[50], where uncertainties may be aleatoric (data dependant)
or epistemic (model dependant) [48]. Unfamiliar test data
distributions, as a result of either insufficient original training
data or a distributional shift, are common examples causing
model uncertainty [38].
Gal [39] argued that Softmax outputs in a DNN classi-
fier should not be interpreted as its prediction confidence.
They experimentally showed that for out-of-distribution test
samples, a model can have high Softmax outputs at times
when predictions should be highly uncertain. Moreover, Gal
and Ghahramani [49] illustrated that by using stochastic
regularization techniques, DNNs can be viewed as Bayesian
approximators of Gaussian process. Using this Bayesian Deep
Learning (BDL) view, one can easily estimate a model’s
confidence without needing to change its architecture.
For end-to-end autonomous systems in which a DNN
takes raw sensory data as input and maps them to con-
trolling commands (e.g., steering, braking, acceleration,
etc.), finding model uncertainties is a simple procedure.
Michelmore et al. [50] proposed to add dropout layers to
NVIDIA’s PilotNet (i.e., an end-to-end self-driving car system)
as a stochastic regularizer in the training step. However, they
were also utilized at test time to extract the model confidence,
by computing the model output multiple times for each input
image.
Figure 4 shows an illustration of two different end-to-
end autonomous systems with and without model uncertainty.
Bayesian deep neural networks can be substituted to provide
uncertainty in the decision-making process. As seen in Fig-
ure 4, by incorporating uncertainty in the decision-making
process and taking advantage of probabilistic approaches, the
system can provide more reliable predictions, better decision-
making, and safer actions.
However, in a modularized autonomous architecture, where
the system is organized as a pipeline of subsystems, evaluating
model uncertainties is a much bigger challenge than that of
end-to-end architectures. McAllister et al. [48] stated that in
order to prevent errors generated in perception subsystems to
not propagate through the rest of the pipeline and affect the
entire decision making process, all of the subsystems should
be equipped with Bayesian Deep Learning tools, to allow
uncertainty distributions to be taken into and propagated by
each subsystem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Autonomous driving offers potentially major advantages to
society, such as reducing injury, decreased insurance costs,
and reductions in gasoline usage. The past few years have
witnessed remarkably significant progress towards fully au-
tomated vehicles being present on public roads. However
there do still remain concerns regarding the reliability of the
computer vision and data analysis models operating within
autonomous vehicles, and even more significantly their robust-
ness in different situations. In this manuscript, we examined
the robustness of autonomous systems, focusing on the proper
functioning in adverse conditions/environments and in the
presence of intrusions and adversarial attacks. Practical solu-
tions to mitigate these issues and to improve the robustness of
these models were discussed, ranging from extending datasets
by simulated data, simulated evaluation environments to un-
cover corner cases, and new techniques to better calculate the
uncertainty of such models in decision-making, all strategies
which can help to improve the performance of models in real-
world applications.
The tremendous success of autonomous driving has opened
a vast range of opportunities, for researchers across a wide
range of domains, but also for members of society beginning
to imagine a different future. This excitement has led to raised
expectations and optimistic timelines about how soon such
vehicles might be expected, however for reasons of safety
and engineering ethics, it is essential to fully understand the
robustness and reliability of the designed systems.
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9Supplementary Material
This part provides further details and an extended literature
review on the topics discussed in the main manuscript.
A. AUTONOMOUS DRIVING SYSTEMS
The general architecture of an autonomous driving sys-
tem [1], [2] consists of
1) Sensing the world, consisting of various sensors and
algorithms processing the available data and providing
a semantic scene understanding [3], [4].
2) Localization and mapping, computing the AV pose
(location and orientation) with respect to the surrounding
environment, which is frequently addressed via simulta-
neous localization and mapping (SLAM) techniques [5],
[6], well-known in robotics and off-line pre-mapping [7],
[8].
3) Motion planning, providing different trajectories as
sequences of states, given the environment information,
initial states, and the final goal [9], [10].
4) Decision-making, selecting the optimal trajectory,
while considering other factors like safety, compliance,
etc. [1], [11].
5) Control, actuating components and ensuring that the AV
follows the selected path [1], [12].
B. OBJECT DETECTION & SEMANTIC SEGMENTATION
Different perception models may be used independently for
different tasks such as lane segmentation, traffic sign identifi-
cation, and traffic light detection [13]. However, they can be
formulated as an object detection or a semantic segmentation
problem.
Tables III, IV evaluate the performance of state-of-the-
art methods for semantic segmentation, and Table V the
performance object detection, based on two well-known au-
tonomous driving datasets: CITYSCAPE [14] and KITTI [15].
For Table V, the object detection accuracy is evaluated only
based on detecting cars in the scene; the division into Easy,
Moderate and Hard are predetermined categories in the KITTI
dataset.
C. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS & DEFENCE TECHNIQUES
Adversarial attacks can be categorized as black-box or
white-box attacks [32]. Several techniques have recently been
proposed to analyze this issue and to illustrate the drawbacks
of deep neural networks. These methods can be grouped
TABLE III
SEMANTIC SEGMENTATION EVALUATION: STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS
ARE EVALUATED BASED ON THE PREDICTED MIOU ON THE
CITYSCAPES [14] TEST SET.
Method IoU (%)
ResNet38 [16] 80.60
DeepLabV3+ [17] 82.10
DRN-CRL [18] 82.80
Zhu et al. [19] 83.50
Panoptic-DeepLab [20] 84.20
TABLE IV
SEMANTIC SEGMENTATION EVALUATION: STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS
ARE EVALUATED BASED ON THE PREDICTED MIOU ON THE KITTI [15]
TEST SET.
Method IoU (%)
APMoE Seg [21] 47.96
SegStereo [22] 59.10
AHiSS [23] 61.24
LDN2 [24] 63.51
MapillaryAI [25] 69.56
Zhu et al. [19] 72.83
TABLE V
3D DETECTION RESULTS OVER THE KITTI [15] DATASET; THE
STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS ARE COMPARED BASED ON MEAN AVERAGE
PRECISION (MAP) IN DETECTING 3D BOXES FOR CARS ONLY.
Method Easy(%) Moderate(%) Hard (%)
AVOD [26] 84.41 74.44 68.65
VoxelNet [27] 81.97 65.46 62.85
SECOND [28] 87.43 76.48 69.10
F-PointNet [29] 83.76 70.92 63.65
PointRCNN [30] 88.88 78.63 77.38
STD [31] 89.70 79.80 79.30
together based on the way they calculate the perturbation to
be added to the input data. Table VI shows some of the most
common adversarial attacks and their characteristics.
Several methods have been proposed to address the issue of
deep neural networks facing adversarial attacks. These meth-
ods can be applied in different stages of networks training,
from pre-processing to post-processing or even changing the
architecture of the model. Table VII summarizes some of the
common approaches to improve the robustness of deep neural
networks.
D. MORE DETAIL ON MODEL UNCERTAINTY
Estimating the uncertainty of deep neural networks is chal-
lenging, however several techniques have been proposed to
provide uncertainty in deep neural networks while making pre-
dictions [48], [49], [50], [51]. Model uncertainty is important
factor in the decision-making as it can measure a network’s
prediction confidence, a confidence which can help to provide
a more seamless interaction between human and machine, and
to increase the human trust in understanding and interpreting
network decisions.
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